Legal Question in Personal Injury in Washington

WA Family Car Doctrine #1

Your question appears to be answered in your favor by the case of Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wn.App. 509, 516-17, 524 P.2d 255 (1974), as follows:

In Coffman v. McFadden, 68 Wash.2d 954, 958, 416 P.2d 99, 102 (1966), the court stated:

(4) In order to fasten liability upon the parents for the negligence of the child, under the family car doctrine, the plaintiff must show that the parents owned, provided or maintained the automobile in question, and that it was for the general use, pleasure, and convenience of the family. Mylnar v. Hall, 55 Wash.2d 739, 350 P.2d 440 (1960). . . .

(6) In the determination of whether an automobile is owned by an unemancipated minor child residing at home, or by his parents, the following elements must be considered:

(a) Who paid for the car, (b) who had the right to control the use of the car, (c) the intent of the parties who bought and sold the car, (d) the intent of the parents and the child relative to ownership, (e) to whom did the seller make delivery of the car, (f) who exercised property rights in the car from the date of its purchase to the date of the accident, and (g) any other circumstantial evidence which may tend to establish the fact of ownership. Jerdal v. Sinclair, 54 Wash.2d 565, 342 P.2d 585 (1959).

WA Family Car Doctrine #2 (Hulse cont'd)

Michael's father, Garth Driver, wrote a check to purchase a cashier's check used to purchase the automobile. He accompanied his son when the automobile was purchased; he indicated to his son his belief as to the soundness of the purchase. Michael's mother, Dorothy Driver, wrote monthly checks to pay the automobile insurance premiums on the automobile. The parents had driven the automobile on three or four occasions.

All the Drivers state that any payments made by the parents with respect to the automobile were fully reimbursed by defendant Michael Driver. They also state that the automobile was under the exclusive control of Michael Driver and was only used by other family members with his express permission. The vehicle title was in the name of Michael.

In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider all material evidence and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Diel v. Beekman, 1 Wash.App. 874, 465 P.2d 212 (1970). Where material facts averred in an affidavit are particularly within the knowledge of the moving party, it is advisable that the cause proceed to trial in order that the opponent may be allowed to disprove such facts by cross-examination and by the demeanor of the moving party while testifying. Felsman v. Kessler, 2 Wash.App. 493, 468 P.2d 691 (1970). Applying these principles, the record does raise genuine issues of material fact as to whether the parents owned or provided the automobile in question. However, that does not resolve the issue.

The record contains no evidence, or inference, that the automobile was for the general use, pleasure and convenience of the family, as is necessary for application of the family car doctrine. Coffman v. McFadden, Supra; Mylnar v. Hall, 55 Wash.2d 739, 350 P.2d 440 (1960). The affidavits and depositions show Michael's vehicle was used by other family members on only three or four occasions during the 8 or 9-month period from the time he purchased the vehicle until the accident in question. Each such use was with Michael Driver's express permission or for his own benefit. Under these circumstances, summary judgment in favor of Garth and Dorothy Driver was proper. See Mylnar v. Hall, Supra.